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Alliance Catering at Deakin: the 
Economics of University Cafeterias 




University cafeterias are a common and crucial component of university life as they 
provide cheap and convenient meals for students. Ideally, university cafeterias should also 
be responsible for providing nutritious food at reasonable prices. In practice though, 
university cafeterias often provide less nutritious food and at high prices.   
  One reason for why this may happen is that cafeterias are aware of their unique market 
power. For instance, students consider the opportunity and transportation costs in the 
price they are willing to pay for on-campus services. The costs of preparing meals at home 
or walking to the alternatives are high, as students may prefer to use the time for studying 
or socializing. Thus, for a variety of reasons, university cafeterias become more practical in 
their delivery of services by placing less concern on the health quality of products and the 
fairness of prices. 
  In this paper, we study the market power of university cafeterias specifically due to a 
locational advantage by analyzing the case of the Alliance Cafeteria operating in Buildings 
La and Lb at Deakin University’s Burwood campus in Melbourne. We begin by examining 





DPIBE, July 2010  Alliance Catering 
 
Patilaya et. al.  2 
 
Alliance’s Market at Deakin 
The Alliance cafeteria operates in what can be understood as a monopolistically 
competitive market at Deakin University. There are usually three characteristics of 
monopolistic competition: a large number of firms, differentiated products and free entry 
and exit. At Deakin there are seven on-campus cafeterias providing a range of slightly 
differentiated fast foods and serving a small number of customers. During our interview 
with Alliance’s supervisor we learned that this differentiation in the products also 
accommodates the preferences of Deakin’s international student community. Finally, there 
are no barriers to open cafeterias at Deakin, as long as premises are available. Firms only 
need to sign a five-year-contract and qualify on the basis of some general conditions 
applicable to the food service industry in Australia. 
  Firms operating in a monopolistically competitive market are able to charge different 
prices from their rivals because they have customers with a certain degree of inelastic 
demand. This is affirmed by comparing Alliance’s prices with its rivals for similar items as 
table 1 illustrates. 
  Table 1 below shows that Alliance charges higher prices than others for the same 
products. A key reason for this is that both Café Plateau and Coles are located further away 
from Buildings La and Lb where Alliance itself is located. This suggests that a key reason for 
the market power that Alliance enjoys is due to its more secluded location from its rivals; 
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 Alliance Café Plateau Coles 
Donuts 2.5 2.2 0.7 
Chocolate Bar 2.4 2.2 2.0 
Fruit Bread 2.5 _ _ 
Coffee 2.7 2.6 _ 
Chips 2.5 _ 0.9 
Franklin 
Water 
2.5 2.2 1.75 
Soft Drink 
(600ml) 
3.2 3.0 2.8 
Red bull 3.3 3.0 2.9 
Ham, Cheese 
& Tomato 5.0 _ _ 
Plain 
Croissants 






Table 1: A price comparison between Alliance, Cafe’s Plateau and Coles 
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Location Models 
Hotelling’s Model  
Hotelling’s Model (1929, cited in Carlton and Perloff, 2005) is a monopolistic competition 
model explaining the location and pricing behaviour of firms.  If there were two firms with 
identical products and prices, consumers simply purchase from the nearest store.  So 
consider that the geographic space of Deakin is bounded between two extreme points on a 
line - Building Lb at one end and Building He at the other. Now suppose we have two firms, 
Alliance and Plateau Café. The Hotelling’s Model suggests that both firms would move their 
locations until they reached an equilirium location where the transportation cost incurred 
by consumers is equal for both firms and both firms maximize their respective profits. This 









  However, this model is not applicable in Alliance’s case since the locations of cafeterias 
are fixed and no further locations are available. Further, Deakin’s cafeterias sell 
differentiated products instead of identical ones. Thus, we extend our analysis by 
considering Salop’s Circle Model. 
 
Salop’s Circle Model 
An application of Salop’s Circle Model for our case would illustrate the cafeterias at 
Deakin as being located around a circle instead of along a line like in Hotelling’s Model. 
Some cafes would be closer to each other while others would be located further apart 
Alliance 
Equilirium 
Plateau Cafe Lb He e 
Figure 1: A Hotelling’s Model Illustration for the location of  Deakin’s Cafeterias 
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along the perimeter of the circle. Further, to particularise the analysis to Alliance’s 
case, we could divide consumers into two groups. The first group is comprised of those 
whose main activities are centred in Buildings La and Lb. The second group are those 
whose activities are not concentrated in Buildings La and Lb.  
 
To understand the utility of consumers in both groups, consider the following equation  
 
 









  The equation suggests that that utility is less likely to be maximized for students located 
in Buildings La and Lb when the ideal cafeteria is located at a greater distance from 
Alliance. Therefore, for the first group, when students do not care intensely about a more 
optimal choice (i.e. c is not very high) due to greater distances, the utility of eating at 
Alliance ‘U’ will remain relatively higher. This happens as consumers consider the 
opportunity and transportation costs.  So, for example, if a given student values socializing 
with peers but her peers have lower perceived utilities from travelling to the outlet she 
considers to be a more optimal choice, this would indirectly lower the level of c for her as 
well.  
        U(t, t*) = u – c |t - t*|                         (1) 
U        : utility of eating at Alliance  
u        : utility of enjoying optimal products at other cafeteria 
t        : Alliance’s location 
t*        : the location of the optimal cafeteria 
|t - t*|  : the distance of Alliance from the location of the optimal cafeteria 
c        : a parameter that scales how much consumers care or value the consumption choices being 
different from the optimal one 
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  For the second group of students the analysis is reversed if Alliance is an optimal choice 
for them and would obviously not matter to those for whom Alliance is perceived as an 
inferior choice relative to the other options that are closer to them.  
  Since Alliance is located further from other cafeterias such as Café Plateau, for a certain 
set of consumers it can behave as a monopolistic firm. Therefore, Alliance can charge high 
prices or serve less nutritious food since the utility loss from buying these high priced 
products is less than buying the cheaper or more nutritious products at other cafeterias. In 
other words, the higher price is still lower when the costs incurred in eating at the other 
cafeterias are considered.  
  Further, using Salop’s Circle Model we could consider the outside or off campus options 




where u stands for the surplus from the outside good and p stands for the prices of 
products sold by Alliance. This equation shows that students will only buy Alliance’s 
products as long as the surplus from consumption at Alliance is the same or exceeds the 
surplus from off campus options. In Alliance’ case, the outside options could be Hungry 
Jack’s which is located at a comparable distance from Alliance as other on-campus 
cafeterias. Hungry Jack’s even offers a special discount to attract students.   
  However, not many students go to Hungry Jack’s, as going there still incurs higher costs. 
Therefore, as long as the utility from eating at Alliance is equal to or higher than the utility 




  This suggests the question about what would be the reservation price for students in the 
first group, or the highest price these students would be willing to pay or the highest price 
Max Alliance [ v - c | t – t*| – p ]  >  0  (3) 
Max Alliance [U (t, t*) – p] ≥ u               (2) 
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Alliance could charge. Salop’s Circle Model provides an insight into this question in 
equation (3) where v is the reservation price. It reasonably suggests that students will shop 
at Alliance only if the surplus is positive.  
  Equation (3) also explains why Alliance’s demand must be elastic, a fact that verified in a 
survey we conducted on 100 students revealing that 19% of students would choose the 
alternatives if Alliance were to increase its prices by 10%. This elastic demand also explains 
the reasons of why Alliance is more monopolistically competitive than purely monopolistic.  
 
Alliance’s Monopoly and Competitive Regions 
The monopoly region, or the area within which Alliance can operate as a local monopoly 
(Figure 2) is applicable for students whose activities are in La and Lb buildings and for 
whom the values for c are low and v are high. The competitive region (Figure 3) is 
applicable for the second group of students, whose activities are not centred in La and Lb 
















v – cx - p 
Distance, x 
Alliance Other cafeterias Other cafeterias 
Figure 2: Monopoly Region for Alliance 
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  The differences between these two regions are in terms of the range of students they 
capture and the quantity demanded.  Alliance’s monopoly region captures the students 




  Figure 2 shows that the further the other cafeterias’ locations are from Alliance, the lower 
the consumer’ surplus would be for Alliance’s customers. Alliance would capture 
consumers in ‘2 ’ circle distance. Thus, if there are ‘L’ students located uniformly near 
Alliance, the quantity demanded is ‘Qm = 2 L’ or: 
Figure 3: Competitive Region for Alliance 
Net surplus 
v – cx - p 
Distance,x 
Alliance (p) Other cafeteria (p*) Other cafeteria (p*) 
              =    (4) 
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which suggests, as we should expect, that the quantity demanded demands inversely on 
how much students care about the quality of Alliance’s products, both in terms of the 
reservation price as well as how they perceive the location of other, more optimal, options 
compared to Alliance.  
 
Alliance also faces a competitive region for students that are located between two or more 
cafeterias (for instance, those students who have classes in buildings that are all over the 
campus and not just in Buildings La and Lb) and may purchase products from the cafeteria 
that gives the highest surplus. Hence, Alliance may lose such customers to other rivals.   
  Suppose that the two nearest cafeterias are located ‘1/n’ distance from Alliance and 
charge ‘p*’. Thus, Alliance gets the consumers within the ‘ ’ distance where consumers get 





  The areas where the distance from customers to Alliance and to other cafeterias is equal in 
Figure 3 make the consumers to be indifferent to purchase Alliance’s products or other 





         Qm =  (v - p)       (5) 
v – c  - p = v – c (  - ) – p*  (6) 
Qc =  (  + p* - p)   (7) 
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Market Externalities and Deakin’s role 
There are two types of externalities imposed by the activities of the Alliance Cafeteria in 
Buildings La and Lb at Deakin. The positive externalities are that Alliance provides some 
ancillary services for students such as free use of its microwaves and a place to gather 
centrally and socialize. However, these positive externalities cannot offset the negative 
externalities. For instance, Alliance charges high prices to students as we observed through 
our investigations of prices at other places. Moreover, and this is the key problem in our 
minds, Alliance tends to sell fast food with little nutrition, as it can be stored longer and 
sold faster such as candies and deep-fried foods. Even when Alliance does provide healthy 
food options such as salad or fruits, it charges its customers high prices. Consequently, 
students end up choosing relatively cheaper products (such as the fast food) instead. This 
implies that as Alliance engages in maximizing its profits, the social marginal costs it 
imposes on Deakin’s students become higher than the social marginal benefits.   
  Interestingly, Deakin seems to have an insignificant role or ability in overcoming these 
market failures. For instance, the numbers of vending machines, and the alternatives to 
Alliance in Buildings La and Lb are limited.  
  We suggest that to overcome this problem Deakin should consider involving student 
organizations in monitoring the service of on-campus cafeterias. Greater surplus for 
students and higher social marginal benefits could be achieved if Deakin were to consider 
this information in making its decisions on contracts for on-campus cafeteria services. 
 
References 
 Carlton, DW and Perloff, JM (2005) Modern Industrial Organization, 4th, Pearson Addison 
Wesley, New York. 
 Interview with Alliance’s supervisor, 2 April, 2010. 
 Taggart, DM; Findlay, C and Parkin, M (2003), Microeconomics, 4th edition, Pearson Education, 
New South Wales. 
  
